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Abstract: The emergence of the first literature concerning the methodology of political 
philosophy, which we have witnessed over the last decade, indicates a general methodological 
shift within the discipline. This shift can be interpreted as a sign of the ongoing adjustment of 
political philosophy to the domain of science that had already begun when analytical political 
philosophy incorporated from logical positivism the premise of the unity of method of science 
and philosophy. The urge to have an epistemic source of justification for normative political 
theories lead analytical political philosophy to the development of various methodological 
frameworks from among which reflective equilibrium became the most influential one 
and nowadays it is being considered as the most widely used method in the contemporary 
political philosophy overall. Reflective equilibrium aims to provide knowledge that falls into 
the same category as scientific knowledge; however, it can also lead to various normative 
distortions resulting in the elimination of metaphysics, meta-ethics and religious claims from 
the normative part of political philosophical theorising. These normative distortions not only 
can result in epistemically wrong conclusions; above all, they implicitly affirm the normative 
propositions of political conceptions of liberalism. Hence, the prevalence and uncritical use of 
reflective equilibrium might narrow the topical scope and undermine the reflective and critical 
role of the discipline of political philosophy itself. 
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logical positivism, political liberalism, epistemic value, epistemic justification, reflective 
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The past decade in the discipline of political philosophy was marked by new 
thought-provoking phenomena as we witnessed the emergence of the first propaedeutic 
literature summarising methods and methodological frameworks, mostly dedicated to 
analytical approaches (see e.g. Blau 2017, Floyd 2017, List and Valentini 2016, Leopold 
and Stears 2008, Dowding 2016). This trend indicates a shift towards a method-based (or 
even a method-driven) inquiry, which can be interpreted as a sign of an ongoing tendency 
to establish a more scientific political philosophy and to affirm its status in science in 
general. To understand the cause of this methodological shift, we need to see it in the 
broader context linked to the problematic position of political philosophy within political 
science and the system of science as such, which can be partly attributed to the general 
separation between the domains of philosophy and science. This separation is mirrored in 
their institutional division into the sciences and the humanities. That, however, does not 
usually apply to political philosophy, which is more often based in institutions’ political 
1] This paper was written at Masaryk University with the support of Czech Science Foundation 
under grant GA19-11091S and Specific University Research Grant provided by the Ministry of Education, 
Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.
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science departments.2 It is their common subject of study – politics – which links political 
philosophy to political science rather than to philosophy. For this reason, the problem 
of the epistemic status of political philosophy within political science becomes even 
more apparent as the growing discrepancy between the disciplines negatively influences 
political philosophy in many practical aspects.3
While political science justifies and legitimises its epistemic authority by 
referring to its methods, which should lend its inquiry basic replicability and validity, 
in political philosophy the vast majority of authors still do not perceive their endeavour 
as a methodologically-based process (Leopold and Stears 2008, 1). Consequently, 
political philosophy lacks a wide consensus on existing methodological approaches and 
frameworks (Dryzek et al. 2006, 6) that would provide a clear idea of how it should be 
done and subsequently how its outcomes can be assessed. Political philosophy is divided 
by its inner ideological tensions and, owing to this, has become fractured into ‘a number 
of parochial professionally and intellectually inspired discursive enclaves’ (Gunnell 1993, 
268). Gunnell’s point refers to the fact that the often-disputable normative outcomes of 
political philosophy are for many (scholars and the general public as well) indistinguishable 
from the subjective political preferences hidden in the complicated philosophical 
language. These facts, in many ways, result in a confusing discussion within political 
philosophy itself, as it is not clear which disagreements are caused by misunderstanding 
the disputed matter, which can be attributed to the form of its justification and which are 
a consequence of the un-reflected and un-explained methodological presuppositions. 
This, subsequently, contributes to overall non-transparency which decreases the 
trustworthiness and epistemic authority of the whole discipline.
There is empirical evidence for this trend. A survey conducted among American 
political philosophers found that only 24 per cent of them agreed with the statement: 
‘Political philosophy is respected among political scientists’ (Moore 2010, 266). The 
survey also revealed that political philosophers think that their publication and conference 
opportunities are low compared to those of empirical political scientists; accordingly, 
2] In this regard, see also the professional academic organisations of political science (e.g. ECPR, 
APSA, IPSA) which usually have a sub-section dedicated to the discipline of political philosophy/theory, 
(see Kaufman-Osborne 2010, 659). Furthermore, Kaufmann-Osborne describes the political philosophy/
theory as one of the substantive subfields of political science, that reflects common status within the region 
of the United States (Kaufman-Osborne 2006, 44).
3] The growing gap between the disciplines already negatively influences the quality of knowledge 
that both disciplines produce. While political philosophy, in general, ignores the findings of empirical 
political science and political philosophers predominantly comment on their own works (the so-called 
narcissistic attribute of political philosophy) and consequently its outcomes lack social and scientific 
relevance, political science, on the contrary, faces banality of part of its research, which is conducted 
with a view to methodological feasibility, rather than the palpability of a particular issue or examined 
phenomenon (see Shapiro 2005, 179). Similarly, Gerring and Yesnowitz stressed that in political science 
we encounter the accumulation of socially irrelevant researches, whose authors in many respects lack 
the theoretical guidance not only for their interpretation, but for the very justification of their realisation 
(Gerring and Yesnowitz 2006, 104).
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they hold the view that political philosophy overall is under-represented within political 
science (see Moore 2010). A second survey (Moore 2011) on political philosophy 
teaching practices found that 26 per cent of schools that teach political science have no 
political philosophy on the curriculum (Moore 2011, 124). Based on this survey, it is clear 
that political philosophy is being treated as non-essential in a large proportion of political 
science departments (Moore 2011, 124). This problem was also reflected in the discussion 
about the marginalisation of political philosophy in the American academic environment 
(see e.g., Kasza 2010, Hawkesworth 2010, Brown 2010).
 The current methodological discussion can be thus interpreted as an effort by 
political philosophers to adjust to the domain of science rather than philosophy, in order 
to restore and secure political philosophy’s position within political science. This article 
outlines the historical context of the division between political science and political 
philosophy, which will clarify where the discussion on methods within political philosophy 
comes from. In particular, I discuss the heritage of logical positivism’s claim on the unity 
of method of science and philosophy, which analytical political philosophy has adopted. 
I also examine the current dominant methodological framework of analytical political 
philosophy – reflective equilibrium – which aims to provide knowledge that falls into the 
same category as scientific knowledge. Nonetheless, due to its epistemic desiderata it leads 
towards various normative distortions that favour the political conceptions of liberalism 
and therefore negatively influence the critical role of political philosophy by putting it in 
an affirmative position towards a particular ideology. Thus the paper outlines the sources 
of these normative distortions and examines the general overlap between the heritage of 
logical positivism and analytical political philosophy, its methods and political liberalism. 
This general outline provides a comprehensive view of the changes through which political 
philosophy as an academic discipline is passing. This should aid self-reflection within 
political philosophy – one of the signs of healthy development in any academic discipline. 
1. CONTE XT: THE DE ATH A N D R ESUR R ECTION OF POLITICA L PHILOSOPH Y 
Although the roots of political science can be traced with confidence to ancient 
Greek political philosophy, its current practice is most influenced by the birth of the 
social sciences in the 19th century (Berg-Schlosser and Stammen 2000, 16) when it was 
emancipated from philosophy and emulated the natural sciences to reach the status of 
an authentic science (Winch 2003, 1). While science can be defined as ‘a cumulative way 
to reach the objective truth through formal argument and regulated observation’ (Leca 
2010, 530), political philosophy, on the other hand, has a more ambivalent character. 
As a philosophy, it could be considered as part of the vita contemplativa that is formed by 
purely thinking about, critically evaluating, and persistently doubting, the limits of our 
knowledge (Leca 2010, 526). The adjective political, however, implies that it is also linked 
to the vita activa – the world of real politics, to which it aims to serve as a guide (Leca 2010, 
526). This subsequently implies that the normative, prescriptive and evaluative ambitions 
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of political philosophy are inherently problematic for the (alleged) norm-neutrality 
declared by contemporary political science (see e.g. Kellstedt and Whitten 2013, 18). 
Max Weber defined the vocation of political science as the study of ‘what is’ rather than 
‘what ought to be’, which belongs to the domain of politics itself (Gunnell 2010, 1397). 
The normative status of political philosophy is therefore linked with the normative 
status of politics. For this reason, the position of political philosophy in the system of 
science became dubious. 
The revolutionary tendencies in the social sciences that called for the strict separation 
from philosophy were, however, rather a ‘Jacobin affair’ (Godin and Klingeman 1996, 
10). This label refers to the ruthless and remorseless way in which the new-born social 
sciences, rooted in positivist epistemology, treated the ‘ancien régime’ of the branches 
with philosophical foundations. One of the memorable features of this debate was Peter 
Laslett’s famous quotation: ‘For the moment, anyway, political philosophy is dead’ (1956, 
6). According to him, the ‘death’ of political philosophy was partly caused by the terrible 
experience of World War II, which engendered a sceptical reaction to great political-
philosophical projects. Sociological thinking, flourishing at the time, suddenly explained 
the problems of political philosophy as mere epiphenomena of socially-determined facts, 
which could be revealed exclusively through the empirical analysis of society. Laslett 
largely blamed logical positivism for this ‘death’, because it questioned the status of 
ethical judgments and raised the question of whether political philosophy is possible 
at all (see Laslett 1956, 9). Similarly, Leo Strauss emphasised that behind the decline of 
political philosophy stood positivism, which rejected political philosophy as unscientific 
and therefore illegitimate (1988, 346).
 Nonetheless, to understand the genuine cause of the decline of political philosophy 
(and subsequently also the cause of its resurrection), we need to focus on its state in the 
middle of the 20th century. If we compare the influence and importance of interwar 
political-philosophical endeavour, we will hardly find any works that could equal the 
importance of pre-war or turn-of-the-century output (Wolff 2013, 7). This idea was 
expressed by Isaiah Berlin, who in a 1962 article claimed that the 20th century had so far 
produced no distinctive set of influential canonical works that would raise any innovative 
and fundamentally important thoughts to stimulate the discipline intellectually. Brian 
Barry pointed out that political philosophy was established on the study of past writers 
(1970, 1). Similarly, David Easton, from the behavioural side of the barricade, attributed 
the ‘poverty of political theory’ to its devotion to historical analysis (1951, 36). Thus the 
alleged death (or decline, to be more precise) of political philosophy in the last century can 
be explained not only as the consequence of the rise of logical positivism, the behavioural 
revolution and the overall triumph of science over philosophy, but also as a result of 
its own degeneration, intellectual staleness and lack of development. Nonetheless, 
subsequent global cultural-political changes brought new stimulus to political 
philosophical theorising as political philosophers were challenged by the question: how 
can we live together in pluralistic and heterodox societies, divided as they are by the deep 
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political disagreements4 of their citizens? Thus the subsequent rebirth of the discipline 
in the early 1970s can be interpreted as a reaction to the limits of behavioural and purely 
empirical research that was unable to provide answers to the normative questions that 
were previously presented in political science (Heywood 2005, 25). 
2. THE NEW SCIENTIFIC POLITICA L PHILOSOPH Y
2.1. Positivism and political philosophy: friends or foes? 
However paradoxical it may appear, and despite Laslett’s claim that it was largely 
logical positivism that killed political philosophy, it was also logical positivism that created 
a new political philosophy, the so-called analytical political philosophy that quickly 
became one of the most influential and dominant strands within political philosophical 
theorising. As noted in the introduction, the first literature on the methods of political 
philosophy is mostly concerned with its analytical branch. The reason the discussion of 
methods within political philosophy is centred on this approach will be clearer when 
we look at the intellectual heritage of logical positivism, which analytical philosophy 
incorporated. As one of the most prominent representatives of logical positivism, 
Bertrand Russell, stated: ‘Modern analytical empiricism […] is thus able, in regard to 
certain problems, to achieve definite answers which have the quality of science rather 
than of philosophy’ (1945, 834).5 The unity of scientific method that would be applicable 
to both domains of knowledge (philosophy and science) is the idea that actually opened 
the door for (political) philosophy to acquire a similar epistemic status to the one the 
social sciences gradually gained during the 20th century. The unity of scientific method 
required a solid and consensually-accepted definition of what qualified as ‘scientific’ – 
the so-called demarcation principle that would serve as a criterion upon which we can 
distinguish scientific from pseudo-scientific arguments (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 39). 
This demarcation principle was for the logical positivists the criterion of verification, 
which excluded pseudoscientific, ethical and metaphysical claims that were considered 
meaningless because they could not be subjected to finite and evident testing that would 
conclusively identify them as true or false6 (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 39; Hacking 
1975, 94). As one of the intellectual fathers of logical positivism, Rudolf Carnap, stated: 
4] The deep political disagreement can be (drawing on R. Talisse) linked to the persistent disagree-
ments over fundamental moral doctrines that can be hold by sane, intelligent, sincere, and informed per-
sons, therefore for ‘every citizen holding a plausible doctrine, there are other citizens holding opposing but 
also plausible doctrines’ (Talisse 2009, 13).
5]  Russell ’s term ‘modern analytical empiricism’ can be used interchangeably with logical posi-
tivism – see e.g. Creath 2017. 
6] This did not disqualify philosophy as such, the key role of which – according to the logical positiv-
ists – was to determine and bestow the meaning of language as a representation of the empirical (sensually 
perceptible) reality (Schwartz 2012, 63; Pincock 2016, 94).
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‘In the domain of metaphysics, including all philosophy of value and normative theory, 
logical analysis yields the negative result that the alleged statements in this domain are 
entirely meaningless. Therewith a radical elimination of metaphysics is attained.’ (Carnap 
1932: 60-61, in Hacking 1975: 96) The heritage of positivism can be summarised as the 
insistence that statements be testable – and consequently verified, confirmed or shown to 
be false. The ‘new’ philosophy that was supposed to fulfil these criteria is generally known 
as analytical philosophy and, in the field of political science, this role was assigned to 
analytical political philosophy.
As the term suggests, analytical political philosophy is part of a general philosophical 
strand known as analytical philosophy, linked to the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition 
and nowadays it is the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world 
(Beaney 2013). Thus analytical philosophy can be perceived as a methodological 
counterpart to the tradition of phenomenological philosophy – especially concerning 
the role of the individual philosopher and his or her subjective perspective from which 
analytical philosophy tries to abstain. Analytical philosophers, unlike phenomenologists, 
do not believe that philosophy is immersed in subjectivity; indeed, philosophy should 
abstain from it. The starting point, where, according to analytical philosophy, subjectivity 
ends, is language (Peregrin 1992, 8; Dummett 2014, 5).
Nevertheless, it is questionable to what extent analytical political philosophy has 
been influenced by analytical philosophy. Jonathan Wolf (2013, 4) defined three main 
intellectual sources that analytical political philosophy incorporated from analytical 
philosophy. First, the rejection of idealism (in a Hegelian sense) associated with the idea 
of social holism that society or the state exists as an independent moral and metaphysical 
entity that needs to be studied within its own autonomous levels of macroscopic analysis 
(Fay 2002, 67). This feature is clearly visible in contemporary Western political philosophy, 
which is predominantly individualistic as it considers the individual as the main entity 
of political philosophical theorising. Second, the emphasis on logical consistency – 
therefore the requirement for internal validity of normative propositions, e.g. ‘ex falso 
quodlibet’ (statements are capable of being simultaneously true) and deductive closure 
(the requirement that any statement that is logically entailed by the theory also belongs to 
the theory) (for more, see List and Valentini 2016, 14-15). Third, the conceptual analysis, 
since the concepts are the main building units of our thinking represented by language.
According to the claim for the unity of method in science and philosophy raised by 
the logical positivists, analytical political philosophy aims to gain knowledge that falls into 
the same broad category as science (McDermot 2008, 11). As noted above, its domain is 
primarily normative, so while social scientists try to determine the facts about empirical 
reality, analytical political philosophers concentrate on what ought to be done in the 
light of these facts (McDermot 2008, 11). On this count, analytical political philosophy 
exceeded the expectations of logical positivists in many regards. Conceptual analysis, 
logical consistency and methodological individualism became important though not 
the only components of the new political philosophical theorising. More importantly, 
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analytical political philosophy combined two seemingly incompatible elements – 
logical analysis and normativity, which became embedded in the new way of ‘scientific’ 
moral theorising linked to the method-based inference of normative statements and the 
method-based justification of normative political theories. Therefore the main features 
of contemporary analytical political philosophy (drawing on Miller and Dagger, 2003, 
446–9) can be defined as follows: 
(1) It is essentially separate from deep metaphysical questions about the meaning of 
human life,
(2) It involves conceptual clarity and argumentative rigour, 
(3) It is normative, 
(4) It addresses a plurality of competing values, and
(5) It aims to serve as the public philosophy of a society of free and equal citizens 
who have choices to make about how their society is organised. 
2.2. The elimination of metaphysics as a shared viewpoint of political liberalism and 
analytical political philosophy 
When we examine the aforementioned features of analytical political philosophy, 
we find a normative overlap with the requirements of political liberalism. It is the 
combination of methodological individualism and the aspiration to formulate normative 
and prescriptive theories to address deep disagreements in society that is, in many regards, 
also the starting position of political liberalism. The underlying aim of philosophical 
endeavour in the liberal political perspective is not to determine ‘what we ought to do’ but 
rather ‘what we ought to do when we don’t agree on what we ought to do’. This is reflected in 
Miller and Dagger’s fourth point, in which they stated that analytical political philosophy 
addresses a plurality of competing values that result in deep disagreement in society. Their 
first point, about the separation of analytical political philosophy ‘from deep metaphysical 
questions’, is the inevitable consequence of the aspiration to address deep disagreement 
that emerges in the sphere of metaphysics and as such cannot be conclusively resolved, 
verified or falsified. 
Political liberalism proposes a similar requirement for the avoidance of metaphysical 
doctrines in the sphere of ‘the political’ (Nussbaum 2011, 16), which can best be 
understood in contrast with perfectionist7 or comprehensive liberalism. Drawing on 
Rawls, political liberalism aims for ‘a political conception of justice as a freestanding view. 
It offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine beyond what is implied by 
the political conception itself ’ (Rawls 1995, 10). This refer to the general liberal idea of 
desirability of the neutral state, that should be ‘neutral among different conceptions of 
the good life and comprehensive doctrines’ (Wall 2015, 163). ‘Freestandingness’ - as the 
7]  Perfectionist liberalism can be defined as a ‘ family of views regarding the conception of the 
good life, and not just our role as citizens’; or views about ‘the ultimate nature of the human good’ 
(Larmore 1996, 122, 132).
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core element of the neutrality of the state - can be therefore attributed to the way these 
doctrines are derived (thus by the method through which we derive such doctrines, norms 
and normative theories). For Rawls in particular, ‘freestandingness’ was guaranteed by 
the ‘neutrality’ of the original position (Gaus and Van Schoelandt 2017, 8-9).
 Gerald Gaus made the point that political liberalism ‘seeks to return liberalism to its 
founding insight that we must live together without sharing our deepest visions’ (2011). 
For this reason, advocates of political liberalism usually propose it as an alternative to the 
ideological sectarianisms within political philosophy (Gaus 2011). Political liberalism 
therefore shields itself by, and derives its legitimacy from, the method-based process of 
justification that aims at a superior normative status, since it refers to some common 
ground (e.g. rationality, reasonableness, intelligibility, reasons all can accept etc) that can 
be objectively determined through its methods. The elimination of metaphysics from 
the sphere of political theorising is therefore one of the shared standpoints of political 
liberalism and analytical political philosophy. This can be attributed to the heritage of 
positivist thinking on verifiability. In the context of political philosophy this implies that 
the statements are being tested upon some shared norms and beliefs, which in this process 
play similar role as empirical data in empirical research. The metaphysical propositions 
that are subject of the deepest political disagreements cannot however serve this way since 
there is no conclusive way of determining their correctness. The deeper indeterminacy 
between the elimination of metaphysics and the methodological basis of analytical 
political philosophy and political liberalism will be examined in the following section. 
3. THE M ETHOD OF R EFLECTI V E EQUILIBR IU M A N D ITS EPISTEMIC I MPACT ON THE 
DISCIPLINE OF POLITICA L PHILOSOPH Y 
The urge to have an epistemic and method-based source of justification for 
normative political theories leads analytical political philosophy to the development of 
various methodological frameworks (partially by emulating the methods of empirical 
sciences – for example, by pursuing thought experiments). One of the most influential 
methods in contemporary analytical political philosophy (and political philosophy as a 
whole) is reflective equilibrium8 (McPherson 2015, 652; Cath 2016, 2014; Sinnott and 
Armstrong et al. 2010, 246; MacMahan 2013, 110), mostly known from the Rawlsian 
tradition.9 Reflective equilibrium is considered an epistemic methodological tool, that 
is a tool that aspires to formulate epistemically correct theories, therefore true theories, 
8] One can doubt how much this method is actually used, since most political philosophers do not 
explicitly indicate their use of it (or any other method, in fact). However, as many theorists point out, 
recent moral theorising has a salient and implicit imperative for using this method (Kappel 2006, 133, 
Kagan 1998, 16). 
9] We need to take into consideration that the method itself was already present in philosophy 
before Rawls; the method itself – without being called reflective equilibrium – was ‘invented’ by Nelson 
Goodman.
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theories that are likely to be true or theories that we have good reason to regard as true or 
likely to be true (Kappel 2006, 134).
 The epistemic capacity of the reflective equilibrium is linked to the assessment of 
the external and internal validity of normative political theories. Owing to this fact, it 
has basically the same form as scientific inference (Peregrin and Svoboda 2017, 94) and 
it reflects the theory-testing methods of science (Dowding 2016, 240). Although logical 
consistency and internal validity are necessary criteria for the epistemic correctness and 
intelligibility (see Gaus 1996: 102) it cannot be considered as a sufficient criterion since it 
represents only internal relation of propositions. As G. Gaus points out: ‘If one begins with 
a body of belief without any initial credibility, making it all fit together could not introduce 
credibility’ (1996, 102). The external validity therefore relates to the initial credibility in 
terms of correspondence between the representing and the represented. As Valentini and 
List claim: ‘Any theory is intended to represent, summarize, or capture something “outside 
the theory” itself [...]  Thus, it may capture this correctly, in which case the theory is true, correct, 
or externally valid, or it may fail to do so, in which case it is false, incorrect, or externally invalid ’ 
(2016, 14-15). Therefore, the external validity determines the epistemic correctness of 
normative political theory. 
The method of reflective equilibrium is based on harmonising our considered 
judgments with the general principles we recognise as right. This process aims to achieve 
an acceptable coherence among them that requires these judgements to provide support 
or the best explanation of each other (Daniels 2018). Reflective equilibrium can be, 
thus, attributed to the mentalist approach to moral and political theorising. According 
to mentalism, political philosophers should aim at discovering and applying principles 
that are already implicit in our normative thoughts (see Floyd 2017, 16). This tendency, 
according to Floyd, leads to the persisting disagreements since these principles contradict 
each other and there is no clear justified requirement of how this should be sorted out 
(Floyd, contrary to this, holds a view that political philosophy should take into account 
actual behaviour and actions of real citizens). For this reason, there is no consensus about 
the proper employment of the method of reflective equilibrium, which can be considered 
as both a cause and the consequence of the lack of transparency in the community of 
political philosophers over the question of its methods and methodology. Regarding the 
existing fussiness over the proper use of the method, we need to differentiate between two 
aspects that are subject to criticism, each for different reasons. The first aspect concerns 
the inputs of the whole process, the second concerns operations that are performed 
with them (McPherson 2015, 657). Through these two dimensions, we can examine the 
possible distortions that are linked to the use of the method of reflective equilibrium.
3.1. The ontological basis of the initial inputs 
When employing the method, we need to address the epistemic status of our 
initial inputs (e.g. considered judgements, beliefs or moral intuitions) and their relation 
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to objective reality, so we can subsequently asses the external validity and epistemic 
correctness of the reflected normative theory. In this regard, the method faces a paradox 
because its epistemic capacity can be justified only with reference to the nature of these initial 
inputs, which have to be considered as epistemically self-justificatory (see e.g. McPherson 
2015). This implies that using reflective equilibrium as a methodological tool providing 
epistemically correct theories is burdened with the following presuppositions: (1) There is 
some objectively existing subject of inquiry, (2) this subject is epistemically attainable. 
This problem is subsequently reflected in the two different ways of conducting 
reflective equilibrium, as proposed by T. M. Scanlon, who distinguished between a 
descriptive and a deliberative account of reflective equilibrium. While the former aims to 
characterise the conception of justice (justice serves as an example here; in general, it can 
be substituted by any moral theory or thesis on which we are reflecting) held by a certain 
person or group, the latter should help us figure out what to believe about justice (Scanlon 
2003, 142-43). These two different accounts have different implications for the role of 
‘considered judgements’ or initial inputs in general. While, in the deliberative account, 
considered judgements are our beliefs about some question or problem (morality or justice), 
the descriptive account presupposes that these judgements somehow represent our moral 
intuitions, our moral sensibility or moral truths in general (Scanlon 2003, 142-43). In the 
case of the descriptive account of the method, the outcome theory is not normative or 
justificatory in the sense that it would include some deontic operator or imperative. Rather, 
it is descriptive or explanatory in relation to moral truths, which as such do not imply any 
particular normative proposition. That being said, this implies that reflective equilibrium 
can be used in both senses as two subsequent phases. In the first – descriptive – phase we 
aim to reveal moral truths, while in the second – deliberative – phase we aim to formulate 
a normative theory based on those truths. These two accounts of equilibrium are worthy 
of note, since they mirror the differences between empirical and normative theory and 
the Humean ‘is-ought’ problem, represented by the question of the extent to which the 
“ought” can be defined based on an “is” and accordingly what the relation between facts 
and norms is. Despite the fact that some authors stress (see e.g. G. A. Cohen 2008, 257) that 
the normative principles may have the status of ontological truths as well, the ontological 
status of normative propositions is itself a metaphysical question on which there is deep 
disagreement (Nussbaum 2001, 890). 
3.2. Epistemic desiderata of reflective equilibrium
In regard to the epistemic desiderata of the method, we arrive at the problem of the 
meta-justification of reflective equilibrium that can provide a convincing explanation as to 
why the mechanism and operations performed through the method lead to epistemically 
correct outcomes. For this, we need to identify the general epistemic desiderata of the 
method. Drawing on McPherson (2015, 652), we can define plausibility, vindication 
and adjudication as the most general desiderata of any philosophical (methodological) 
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theory. However, there are also desiderata that depend on the meta-justification of the 
particular method itself. With regard to reflective equilibrium we can, according to 
Kappel (2007, 132), define the following desiderata: consistency; systematicity (a belief 
set should contain explanatory relations); generality (a belief set should cover a larger 
area rather than a smaller one); simplicity (general explanatory beliefs should be few and 
simple rather than many and complex); intuitive acceptability (a moral belief set or moral 
theories should fit our considered moral judgements); and the last desideratum is linked 
to the trade-offs between previous desiderata in order to maximize their overall effect. 
The first four desiderata are linked to the previously mentioned internal validity 
and general logical consistency and as such can be more or less assessed objectively by all 
agents in the same way, according to the rules of logic. Yet the assessment of the fifth and 
sixth desiderata is not connected to the reflected theory itself, but rather to the individual 
agents and their sets of beliefs. Therefore, the assessment of whether these desiderata have 
been met can be interpreted differently by the individual agents and analogically can be 
prone to subjective distortion. Naturally, due to the inclusion of these desiderata, reflective 
equilibrium can be prone to confirmation biases of our prior beliefs or hypotheses, as 
we tend naturally to prefer those principles and those outcomes of equilibrium that are 
convenient to our individual interests, values or cultural background. 
A more implicit normative distortion, linked to the method itself and its epistemic 
desiderata, is the tendency to favour arguments and theories that are separated from the 
domains linked to the deep disagreement. This is one of the main intrinsic methodological 
problems of reflective equilibrium: even though the process through which we are 
reassessing our judgments and principles might end with persisting incoherence – so 
we will not be sure which one of the reflected variants is correct – in general, we aim to 
find a conclusion and decide which of the reflected variants is correct or how we should 
define our moral conception towards some particular problem. As Jaroslav Peregrin 
emphasises, reflective equilibrium makes sense only when the theory or thesis is very 
well confirmed and the contradictory cases are few and not crucial (Peregrin and 
Svoboda 2017, 92). Therefore, if we have a well-confirmed general theory that is already 
consistent at many levels, yet we still have some counterexamples that disprove or falsify 
the theory, we may consider either excluding counterexamples or adjust the theory so it 
grasps these counterexamples (usually at the expense of its generality). This, however, 
might be a moment where the implicit distortion of reflective equilibrium emerges. This 
issue is linked with our aspiration to achieve a final and definite statement. As Wayne 
Norman noted (1998), to do this, we have to avoid inherently problematic questions and 
judgements on which there is likely to be disagreement – those linked to the ‘metaphysics, 
meta-ethics, religion and “speculative” theories of the human sciences and linguistics’ 
(Norman 1998, 284). 
This inherent feature of reflective equilibrium is paradoxical, in that the method was 
developed to provide a basis for the formulation of general rules on how society should be 
organised in the context of pluralist, heterodox states divided by the deep disagreements 
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of their citizens. Nevertheless, it appears that the way to solve this disagreement is to 
exclude it by narrowing the scope of reflected domains and issues to the less problematic 
ones. This tendency can be subsequently attributed to the heritage of positivist thinking 
that treated questions linked with metaphysics and meta-ethics as illegitimate, since they 
could not be conclusively falsified or verified. For a similar reason, political liberalism also 
requires separation from metaphysics, as that is (from the perspective of political liberals) 
the only way to evade deep disagreement. We can conclude that reflective equilibrium 
serves affirmatively towards the normative requirements of political liberalism as it 
basically reproduces its normative propositions. As such, it cannot provide a freestanding 
justification because the epistemic desiderata of the method are not epistemically justified 
themselves and lead to various normative distortions.
3.3. How to incite epistemic capacity of reflective equilibrium? 
One possible way of dealing with the distortions inherent in the method is to 
challenge its individualistic account. Alice Baderin argues that reflective equilibrium 
should be used as a public method of inquiry, in the modest sense (2017, 3) because of 
the superiority of public opinion over philosophical opinion. Furthermore, there might 
also be epistemic reasons for using reflective equilibrium on the public account. We can 
relate to the arguments proposed by proponents of epistemic democracy usually linked 
to Condorcet’s jury theorem10 and the importance of dispersing knowledge which should 
magnify the epistemic diversity of the initial inputs of reflective equilibrium.11 As David 
Estlund puts it: 
It is natural to suppose that there would be even more epistemic value if each, 
incorporating his or her special self-regarding information into an overall view, were 
to apply intelligence directly to the question ‘What ought we to do?’ Not only might 
each come to a more accurate view on that question but also now they are in a position 
to reason with each other about a common topic. (2007, 177-78)
The use of reflective equilibrium on the public account can therefore not only increase 
its epistemic correctness by including diverse inputs at the initial phase, but also tackle the 
problem of confirmation biases linked to the strictly individualistic and subjectivist use 
of the method and the tendency of agents to affirm the arguments and norms that favour 
their own interests. Furthermore, the public use of the method is the only justifiable way 
of determining whether the questions linked to the deep comprehensive views (that is, 
the previously mentioned metaphysical, meta-ethical or religious questions) of individual 
10] ‘If each member of a jury has an equal and independent chance, better than random but worse 
than perfect, of making a correct judgment on whether a defendant is guilty (or on some other factual propo-
sition), the majority of jurors is more likely to be correct than each individual juror, and the probability of a 
correct majority judgment approaches 1 as the jury size increases. Thus, under certain conditions, majority 
rule is good at “tracking the truth ’ (List 2013). 
11] This idea was originally proposed by F. A. Hayek with respect to the free-market mechanism, how-
ever nowadays it is also one of the main arguments of the advocates of deliberative models of democracy. 
Tereza Krepelová 89
agents are truly unresolvable or whether we can find some overlapping consensus and 
minimal agreement on some basic norms, principles and reasons. In other words: in order 
to be able to conclude whether there really are some shared reasons or reasons that ‘all 
can accept’, we need to actually include and ask ‘all’, rather than theorise about this matter 
from a strictly individualistic perspective. 
4. CONCLUSION A N D FINA L R EM A R KS: W H Y W E NEED MOR E PROFOU N D DISCUSSION 
ON M ETHODS IN POLITICA L PHILOSOPH Y
In this paper, I argued that the discussion concerning the methods of political 
philosophy should not be separated from the discussion about the position and role of 
political philosophy within political science (and science in general). The current discussion 
on the methodology of political philosophy indicating a general shift to the method-based 
process of inference within political-philosophical theorising can be a sign of ongoing 
‘positivisation’ and the efforts of political philosophers to adjust political philosophy to the 
domain of science. This process had already begun as the analytical political philosophy 
incorporated premises from logical positivism about the unity of method of science and 
philosophy. The heritage of logical positivism that is visible in contemporary analytical 
political philosophy can be attributed to the insistence on the verification and assessment 
of external validity of normative political theories in order to provide a scientific type of 
knowledge.
This tendency, however, affects the overall topical scope of the discipline and results 
in its ‘de-metaphysication’, since metaphysical statements cannot be conclusively verified 
or falsified. I have outlined the limitations of the method of reflective equilibrium, which, 
due to its epistemic desiderata, results in evading issues producing deep disagreement 
– typically those linked to metaphysical questions. For this reason, the uncritical use of 
reflective equilibrium can undermine the critical role of political philosophy, as it leads to 
an implicit affirmation of the normative stance of political liberalism, which is to eliminate 
metaphysical sources of justification from the political.
 I have argued that the epistemic capacity of reflective equilibrium is not separable 
from the presupposition about the ontological basis of the initial inputs as well as from 
its overall epistemic desiderata. For this reason, it is questionable to what extent reflective 
equilibrium produces epistemically correct outcomes solely on the grounds of its 
own mechanism since epistemic correctness derives from the presupposition about 
the initial inputs and epistemic desiderata of the whole process. For this reason, it also 
seems indefensible to use reflective equilibrium as a justificatory basis providing the 
‘freestandingness’ of a political justification within political liberalism (or elsewhere).
Nonetheless, the criticism of reflective equilibrium and the analytical branch 
should by no means serve as an argument for refuting this branch and its methods (or 
discussion on methods in political philosophy) en bloc. Rather, a further rethinking of 
the proper employment of the method is necessary. Regarding the epistemic aims of the 
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method, it is important to recognise the impossibility of a conclusion as one of the possible 
epistemic outcomes. For the discipline of political philosophy, this means accepting deep 
disagreements and essential pluralism not just as the initial problems that should be solved 
through the method-based process of inquiry but also as the possible and legitimate 
outcome of it. As McPherson states, one of the reasons we need a methodology of political 
philosophy is to determine whether the central substantive disagreements can be attributed 
to the methods as such or to the disagreeing parties (see McPherson 2015, 654). 
Nevertheless, the establishment of the criteria for the assessment of the reliability 
and epistemic capacity of the methods of political philosophy is a task still to be done. 
Largely, it is dependent on the habits, practices and standards of the community of 
political philosophers, which would, indeed, benefit from greater transparency and 
methodological clarity not only for the sake of those who want to engage with the 
discipline themselves (the political philosophers to be) but also for anyone (whether they 
are academics, politicians or members of the general public) who would like to establish 
their knowledge of politics on philosophical foundations. To systematically and explicitly 
reflect how we formulate our normative propositions is the first step towards regaining 
and securing the credibility of the discipline of political philosophy and consequently also 
towards restoring its epistemic authority and relevance in the system of science.
krepelova@mail.muni.cz
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